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Abstract—We explore the feasibility of automati-
cally finding accounts that publish sensitive content
on Twitter. One natural approach to this problem is
to first create a list of sensitive keywords, and then
identify Twitter accounts that use these words in their
tweets. But such an approach may overlook sensitive
accounts that are not covered by the subjective choice
of keywords. In this paper, we instead explore find-
ing sensitive accounts by examining the percentage of
anonymous and identifiable followers the accounts have.
This approach is motivated by an earlier study showing
that sensitive accounts typically have a large percent-
age of anonymous followers and a small percentage of
identifiable followers.
To this end, we first considered the problem of au-
tomatically determining if a Twitter account is anony-
mous or identifiable. We find that simple techniques,
such as checking for name-list membership, perform
poorly. We designed a machine learning classifier that
classifies accounts as anonymous or identifiable. We
then classified an account as sensitive based on the
percentages of anonymous and identifiable followers the
account has. We applied our approach to approximately
100,000 accounts with 404 million active followers.
The approach uncovered accounts that were sensitive
for a diverse number of reasons. These accounts span
across varied themes, including those that are not
commonly proposed as sensitive or those that relate to
socially stigmatized topics. To validate our approach,
we applied Latent Dirichlet Allocation (LDA) topic
analysis to the tweets in the detected sensitive and
non-sensitive accounts. LDA showed that the sensitive
and non-sensitive accounts obtained from the method-
ology are tweeting about distinctly different topics. We
further confirmed that independent human evaluators
generally agree with our automated sensitive account
classification results. Our results show that it is indeed
possible to objectively identify sensitive accounts at the
scale of Twitter.
I. Introduction
Developing policy for online privacy is complex because
users’ preferences are highly contextual and vary based on
the type of content being shared and the sender’s relation-
ship to the recipient [2]. Introducing appropriate privacy
A shorter 4-page version of this work has been published as a poster
in the International AAAI Conference on Web and Social Media
(ICWSM), 2016 [1]. This work was supported in part by the NSF
(under grant CNS-1318659).
controls necessitates defining and identifying sensitive con-
tent, that is, content that needs special consideration and
protection. However, there is a clear disparity among the
legal and data protection authorities and the online service
providers about what constitutes sensitive content [3], [4],
[5], [6]. This lack of a universal definition makes it hard
to simply enumerate a list of sensitive content categories.
In addition, due to the contextual differences, sensitive
content categories identified for one application might not
directly translate to another. These challenges complicate
the process of identifying online content users would deem
sensitive.
In this paper we consider identifying sensitive content on
Twitter, to help design novel privacy policies and controls
for online social media applications. Specifically, we seek
to develop an efficient automated means for identifying ac-
counts that tweet sensitive content. An automated means
for identifying sensitive accounts is of interest for several
reasons:
• Social networks suffer from intentional service abuses
and illegal activities, such as spreading child porno-
graphy, weapons trafficking, or sales of narcotics. [7],
[8]. Although Twitter by itself does not regulate con-
tent [9], legal authorities could benefit from an au-
tomated sensitive account detection system, helping
them sift through vast amounts of Twitter data and
narrowing their investigation targets.
• Twitter does not regulate content in tweets, but it
does require that content that might be considered
sensitive – such as nudity, violence, medical proce-
dures – be appropriately tagged as such [9]. Cur-
rently, Twitter primarily relies on highly irregular
(but effective) crowd reporting to detect any policy
violations [10], but its reach is limited due to human
involvement. Automated sensitive account identifica-
tion can provide an additional signal to detect policy
violations and help maintain the health of the Twitter
ecosystem.
• As we show in this work, many Twitter accounts
addressing self-help in stigmatized areas such as obe-
sity, anorexia, and depression will be identified by
our methodology. This reaffirms that content sensi-
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tivity is quite nuanced and is not restricted to the
usual suspects. Once these sensitive self-help sites are
identified, they can be more easily shared with those
seeking or providing help.
• Finally, the issue of content sensitivity has become a
fundamental question for modern social media [11],
[12], [13], [14]. Novel means for identifying sensitive
content can shed significant insight on contemporary
social media, and aid in updating privacy features and
policies.
A. Traditional Approaches
One natural approach of identifying sensitive accounts is
to specify categories of sensitive topics, and then identify
words that commonly occur when discussing these topics.
We could then search the tweets to see which accounts
employ these “sensitive words” in both tweet words and
hash tags. This approach has the drawback of being highly
subjective, in that it relies on humans to define sensitive
topics and words. Also, it is shown that humans can easily
miss many topic categories due to subjectivity [13]. In
machine language terminology, this sensitive-word based
approach tends to “overfit” the selected keywords and does
not generalize well across all possible topics.
A second approach would be to apply automatic topic
identification techniques, such as Latent Dirichlet Alloca-
tion (LDA), on tweets to identify sensitive topic themes.
We can then identify accounts that relate to these sensi-
tive themes. However, automatic topic identification tech-
niques are highly resource intensive. Processing tweets of a
few million users requires powerful machine clusters with
large computing power [15], [16]. These techniques cannot
scale to the size of Twitter with hundreds of millions of
users. (In our work we do use LDA but restrict it to
validation of a few thousand Twitter accounts.)
In this paper, we take a different approach to finding
sensitive accounts – one that generalizes better to unfore-
seen topics, is not limited by the language features, and is
easily scalable to the size of Twitter.
B. Our Approach
Twitter does not enforce a real-name policy, enabling
some users to adopt non-identifying pseudonyms (termed
anonymous accounts) and others to voluntarily reveal
their identities by disclosing their full names (termed
identifiable accounts). A recent study leveraged Amazon
Mechanical Turk (AMT) to analyze accounts relating to
sensitive topics (such as pornography, religious hatred, and
drugs) and non-sensitive topics (such as news and family),
finding that the sensitive accounts have relatively large
percentages of anonymous followers and relatively small
percentages of identifiable followers, and vice versa for
the non-sensitive accounts [11]. Another study on Whis-
per social network has made a similar observation that
anonymous content is generally more sensitive compared
to non-anonymous content [12]. In this paper, we make use
of this observation to develop a novel data-driven approach
to identify sensitive accounts.
In this work, we consider a Twitter account to be
sensitive if it has a relatively large number of anonymous
followers and a relatively small number of identifiable
followers. This alternative definition does not directly
depend on specific sensitive words that humans choose.
To automatically find the sensitive accounts on Twitter,
we first consider the sub-problem of automatically deter-
mining if a Twitter account is anonymous or identifiable.
We then develop a heuristic for classifying an account as
sensitive as a function of the percentages of anonymous
and identifiable followers that the account has. We applied
our approach to approximately 100,000 accounts with 404
million active followers. In addition to detecting many
of the usual suspects (accounts related to pornography,
drugs, and so on), our approach uncovered many accounts
related to socially stigmatized topics, such as depression,
self-mutilation, obesity, and anorexia.
It is to be noted that traditional machine learning eval-
uation metrics that calculate the detection performance
on a pre-labeled dataset do not work in our scenario.
Since content sensitivity is highly subjective, frequent
disagreements among the human evaluators prevent us
from utilizing manual labeling to generate the ground
truth labels. This is contrary to abuse or spam account
detection, where the accounts clearly violate a specific
set of policies. Hence, in this work we utilize alternate
validation mechanisms, such as LDA. We also check if
independent human evaluators, in spite of their subjective
differences, generally agree with our account sensitivity
classification results.
Contributions:
• We built a machine learning classifier that can detect
anonymous and identifiable Twitter accounts with
more than 90% precision. This approach makes use
of name popularity rankings, word occurrences in
Scrabble word lists (word lists without proper nouns
and names), and Twitter account profile properties.
In comparison, simply checking for name occurrences
from first and last name lists did not give more than
58% precision for anonymous and 70% precision for
identifiable accounts.
• Based on linear functions of an account’s percentages
of anonymous and identifiable followers, we classified
an account as sensitive or non-sensitive. To obtain the
coefficients for the linear functions, we applied our
anonymous account classifier to the followers of the
known sensitive and non-sensitive accounts studied in
[11]. Accounts that our automated methodology la-
bels as sensitive have high percentages of anonymous
followers and low percentages of identifiable followers.
The approach does not directly define sensitivity
in terms of specific words appearing in tweets, and
therefore generalizes to a wider range of sensitive
topics. To show that the proposed methodology can
indeed process data at the scale of Twitter, we applied
our methodology on approximately 100,000 accounts
having a total of 404 million active followers. We
manually analyzed 300 of the identified very sensitive
accounts, and show that these accounts generalize
beyond themes discovered in [11].
• To validate our methodology, we applied Latent
Dirichlet Allocation (LDA) topic analysis to the
tweets in the identified sensitive and non-sensitive
accounts. The LDA analysis confirmed that there is
very little overlap in the topic themes across the
two groups: themes such as drugs, escort services,
pornography and cybersex dominated the sensitive
group; themes such as sports, weather and education
are dominant in the non-sensitive group. We further
validated the approach by asking four humans to
subjectively classify 200 accounts as either sensitive
or non-sensitive, and checked whether their classifi-
cations are consistent with our automated classifica-
tions.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II
discusses the legal and ethical considerations of this work.
Section III provides a brief overview of Twitter, and the
user categories selected. Section IV describes the collected
dataset statistics. Section V describes our custom classifier
to detect anonymous and identifiable accounts. Section VI
describes the proposed approach to automatically detect
sensitive accounts. Section VII validates the proposed
approach by performing LDA topic analysis and analyzing
the detected sensitive accounts. Section VIII discusses the
related work and Section IX concludes the paper.
II. Legal & Ethical Considerations
To conduct this research, we programmed our crawlers
to collect data from Twitter. Performing research using
user data collected from online social networks can be
an ethically sensitive issue. We took several precautions
in our study. First, we used the official Twitter API to
collect data and followed the API rate limits to ensure
the load on the Twitter servers is minimized. Second,
when collecting data using the provided Twitter API, we
limited our collection to publicly available information.
Third, we restricted our analysis to the textual account
profile information alone, and gathered the profile pictures
and the most recent tweets of a couple of thousand Twit-
ter accounts only when absolutely necessary for machine
learning feature selection and validation.
We believe that the only way to reliably estimate success
rates of the proposed methodology is to conduct experi-
ments on large real Twitter data sets. We emphasize that
this research benefits Twitter and other social networks
that do not enforce a real-name policy, by helping them
gain visibility into how users take advantage of (or abuse)
the features supporting online anonymity. Any inferences
we made were based on publicly available data.
III. Background
A. Twitter Overview
When a user creates a Twitter account, he or she
needs to create a profile. The profile includes a unique
alphanumeric ID (sometimes called the screen name), a
name string (often containing a first and/or last name), a
textual description, a profile picture, location information,
and a URL (linking to other social network profiles or
pointing to a website). Everything except the ID field is
optional.
Tweets are the messages posted by users. They are re-
stricted to 140 characters and can contain text, shortened
URLs, user mentions (tagging other users), and hashtags
(a metadata tag used to group messages). Each Twitter
account can follow other accounts and receive their tweets.
When Alice follows Bob, Bob is said to be a friend of Alice,
and Alice is said to be a follower of Bob. Note that if Bob is
a friend of Alice, Alice need not be a friend of Bob (unlike
Facebook). Twitter provides free API access (with request
limits) to obtain publicly available social network data.
B. Account Categorization
Similar to prior work [11], we categorize Twitter users
based on their degree of anonymity:
• Anonymous – A Twitter account containing neither
the first nor last name, and not containing a URL
in the profile (which may point to a web page that
identifies or partially identifies the user).
• Partially Anonymous – A Twitter account having
a first name or a last name but not both in the profile.
• Identifiable – A Twitter account containing both a
first name and a last name in the profile.
• Unclassifiable – A Twitter account that is neither
Anonymous, Identifiable, nor Partially Anonymous.
Accounts which have neither a first nor a last name
but have a URL fall under this category. Also, Twitter
accounts of an organization or a company belong here.
We recognize that Twitter does not support complete
anonymity, as all users are required to choose some screen
name, which is often a pseudonym. However, for all prac-
tical purposes, a pseudonym does not reveal the identity
of the user. Hence we prefer to use the more commonly
employed term anonymous rather than the more obscure
term pseudonymous. Also, some Twitter users may choose
to use fake first and last names, giving the impression
they are identifiable when they are actually anonymous.
Filtering out these fake-name accounts has been shown
to be highly difficult [17]; it is also difficult to estimate
what fraction of seemingly identifiable accounts are fake-
name accounts. As validated in Section VII, this noise does
not seriously impact our ability to automatically classify
accounts as sensitive or non-sensitive.
Twitter is plagued by unused ephemeral accounts or
those created to spread spam [18], [19]. To avoid any bias
on the results caused by these accounts, we remove from
our data sets all user accounts exhibiting signs of being
ephemeral or spam. We say an account is non-ephemeral
if the sum of its friends and followers is non-zero and it
has posted a tweet at least six months after its creation.
Since our study revolves around using user anony-
mity to detect account sensitivity, fake accounts (like
spammers) may alter our results. Fortunately, Twitter
already puts significant effort in blocking spam. Prior
studies have shown that Twitter blocks almost 92% of
the spam accounts within 3 days of the first tweet, and
all of the spam accounts (including those belonging to
big spam campaigns) within 6 months [19]. However, to
be even more certain that our results are not skewed by
spam accounts, we eliminated accounts that have some
resemblance to reported spam account behavior, such as
followers-to-friends ratio being less than 0.1. In addition to
removing ephemeral and spam accounts, we also sanitized
our datasets by eliminating all non-English accounts, i.e.
accounts which do not report English as the language of
preference in their profiles.
IV. Twitter Data Sets
A. Labeled Training Data
We used supervised machine learning to automatically
classify accounts as sensitive, and also classify the account
followers as anonymous or identifiable. For this we lever-
aged Amazon Mechanical Turk (AMT) labeled data from
a prior study [11], which contains two distinct data sets.
The first data set measures the prevalence of anonymity
on Twitter. It contains 100,000 randomly selected accounts
from a public Twitter data set released in 2010 [20].
This data set was sanitized (by removing non-English,
ephemeral, and spam accounts) and labeled using AMT.
The second dataset studies the influence of content sen-
sitivity on user anonymity. It was created by picking 47
Twitter accounts related to the different sensitive cate-
gories (such as pornography, escort services, and racism),
and 20 accounts related to non-sensitive categories (such
as news sites, family recreation, and movies). The fol-
lowers of these 67 accounts were sanitized and labeled
using AMT. The combined labeled accounts from the two
data sets constitute our training set. The distribution of
the accounts across the different anonymity categories is
shown in Table I.
TABLE I: Training Set for Machine Learning
Label # of Twitter Accounts
Identifiable 66,903 (51.3%)
Partially Anonymous 27,734 (21.2%)
Anonymous 19,890 (15.2%)
Unclassifiable 16,105 (12.3%)
Total 130,632
B. Experimental Data Set
To test if we can detect sensitive Twitter accounts by
analyzing their follower anonymity characteristics, and to
evaluate if our approach can process data on the Twitter
scale, we need a new data set that is sufficiently large. We
crawled Twitter from May 31 - Aug 7, 2014. Starting from
the 67 hand-picked accounts in the training set belonging
to the sensitive and non-sensitive topics (the seed list), we
crawled outwards – crawling two levels down of account
followers but randomly selecting branches and accounts.
We sanitized the resulting set by removing all non-English
accounts (as we discuss later, in spite of this filtering we
identify some accounts that post non-English tweets) and
accounts with <200 active (non-ephemeral and non-spam)
followers. Our resulting data set has 93,042 accounts with
approximately 404 million active followers. We applied our
sensitive account discovery methodology to this data set.
V. Automating Identification of Anonymous
Accounts
It has been shown that accounts most people would
deem as sensitive typically have a relatively large number
of anonymous followers and a relatively small number
of identifiable followers [11]. In this paper we consider
automatically identifying sensitive accounts based on these
characteristics. To this end, we need an automated proce-
dure for determining, for each of the account’s followers,
whether the follower is anonymous or identifiable (or
neither).
This section first explores a simple technique: using first
and last name lists to categorize an account as identifiable
or anonymous. We then discuss how machine learning
allows us to classify accounts with a much higher degree
of precision and recall.
A. Categorization Using Name Lists
Since the definitions for all the user groups (Sec-
tion III-B) rely on the presence/absence of first/last names
in the Twitter account’s profile, a straightforward ap-
proach to classify accounts would be to check for mem-
berships in existing lists of common first and last names.
To this end, we obtained public name lists from the United
States Census [21] and United States Social Security
Administration [22]. We gathered a total of 91,340 first
names and 165,640 last names. We observed that simply
checking for occurrences in the name lists results in very
poor anonymous and identifiable detection rates on the
training data set. The detection performance is shown in
Table II.
TABLE II: Detection Performance when Simply Checking
Name Lists
Label Precision Recall
Anonymous 0.58 0.35
Identifiable 0.70 0.83
We noticed the occurrence of common English words
in the first and last name lists – such as Gay, Love,
Clay, Crystal, May – was one of the primary reasons for
the low detection performance. As most of the Twitter
names contain phrases, parts-of-speech taggers were not
very helpful in differentiating the two usages. Even after
imposing structural constraints for the name string (such
as following FirstName MiddleName LastName, First-
Name MiddleInitial LastName, or FirstName LastName
formats with appropriate memberships in first and last
name lists) we did not obtain significant improvement in
the performance.
B. Feature Selection for Classification
Even though membership in name lists did not work
well, this does not mean that accounts cannot be effec-
tively classified by other means. Other profile properties,
such as the rank of occurring names in the first and last
name lists, or the occurrence of non-names in the name
field can also be examined. We used a machine learning
classifier as it is capable of accommodating all these differ-
ent features, and considered the implementations available
in the Weka toolkit [23]. We initially considered all the
features available from a Twitter account’s profile, and
later refined our selection. We mention which features and
representations have the most impact.
It has been observed that pictures sometimes present an
effective way to identify users. To estimate the usefulness
of Twitter profile pictures in deducing the identity of an
account, we conducted a small study. We obtained the pro-
file pictures for 1,000 random accounts from the training
set in each of the anonymous and identifiable categories.
For the identifiable accounts, 61.5% of profile pictures
contained discernible faces. Of the 1,000 anonymous profile
pictures, only 119 had pictures with discernible human
faces. We conducted a Google image search 1 on all the
119 pictures and observed the following: (i) 24 pictures
belonged to popular celebrities/icons; (ii) for 13 pictures
the image search was able to point out a name, because
the same picture was used on personal web pages or
Facebook/Google+ profiles; (iii) in the remaining 82 cases,
image search did not return any results (except pointing
out other pictures with similar color variations/structure).
As the profiles pictures help in deducing identities of
just 1.3% of anonymous accounts, and the identification
procedure is very cumbersome to automate when there are
millions of accounts, we did not include profile pictures in
the feature selection process.
We extracted other pieces of naming related information
available from the screen name and the name fields. We
checked for the structural constraints on the name, and
take into account the popularity ranks of the occurring
names in the name lists. As users often combine their first
and last names into a single word (like ‘Adam J Smith’
occurring in the word ‘adamjsmith’), we considered first or
last names occurring as a sub-string. To limit classification
errors due to English words occurring in name lists, we
1http://images.google.com/
leveraged Scrabble word dictionaries (English word lists
used in the Scrabble board game, generally do not contain
proper nouns) 2 3 and word frequencies obtained from the
British National Corpus 4.
In addition to these name related features, we extracted
other information available from a Twitter account’s pro-
file. We considered the number of friends, followers, tweets,
and favorited tweets (favoriting is done to express likeness
or for archiving the tweet). Twitter users can be grouped
into lists for easy reading of tweet updates from the group
members. We considered the number of lists an account
has membership in. Twitter provides a protected privacy
feature to hide the activity (such as tweets, friends, and
followers) from being publicly visible. Also, a Twitter user
can associate his geographical information to his Twitter
account by activating the geo-tagging feature. We checked
if a Twitter profile uses the protected and geo-tagging
functionalities.
After testing various configurations with the features
and feature representations, we chose 16 features: 12 nu-
meric and 4 boolean. The features are listed in Table III.
In case the profile does not contain any first or last
name occurring in the name lists, then we considered
the maximum possible integer for the corresponding name
popularity rank features. Similarly if the detected first or
last name does not occur in the Scrabble word list, or if
no first and last names are detected, then the Scrabble
word frequency ranks are initialized to the maximum
possible integer. Table III also indicates the information
gain values for each feature. A higher gain value indicates a
stronger influence in detecting anonymous and identifiable
accounts. The top 3 features that help detect anonymous
or identifiable accounts are highlighted in bold.
C. Customized Classifier for Account Anonymity Classifi-
cation
As Table I indicates, we have more than 2 classes. When
there are multiple classes (with dissimilar size distribu-
tions), machine learning classifiers by default try to opti-
mize the overall achievable accuracy at the cost of lower
precision and recall for small sized classes. In our case,
when using all four classes, we noticed low precision and
recall values being reported for anonymous accounts. Even
using different classifiers, optimizing classifier parameters,
and using meta-classifiers (such as multi-class classifica-
tion or cost-sensitive classification) did not improve the
performance. (In multi-class classification, multiple classi-
fiers are built, one for each pair of classes, and the final
classification label for an instance is determined based
on a voting mechanism. In cost-sensitive classification,
additional cost for misclassifying accounts as anonymous
or identifiable is imposed. These costs are used to re-weight
2http://www.freescrabbledictionary.com/sowpods.txt
3http://www.isc.ro/en/commands/lists.html
4Adam Kilgarriff, BNC database and word frequency lists, http:
//www.kilgarriff.co.uk/bnc-readme.html
TABLE III: Selected Feature Set for Machine Learning Classification
Type Feature Information GainAnonymous Identifiable
Numeric
# of friends 0.015026 0.04283
# of followers 0.009373 0.04705
followers-to-friends ratio 0.000822 0.00468
# of user list memberships 0.002298 0.02168
# of tweets 0.005205 0.02584
# of favorite tweets 0.016624 0.0166
number of parts/words in the name string 0.033509 0.19704
popularity rank of occurring first name in the
name list
0.156569 0.23648
popularity rank of occurring last name in the
name list
0.062874 0.2413
# of Scrabble words present in the name 0.023888 0.06242
word frequency rank of occurring first name in the
Scrabble list
0.040174 0.06794
word frequency rank of occurring last name in
Scrabble list
0.033384 0.07316
Boolean
enabled protected privacy feature 0.00023 0.00129
enabled geo-tagging for tweets 0.002429 0.00105
includes a url in the profile 0.091024 0.00821
name follows structural constraints 0.044985 0.185
the training instances or to predict the class with minimum
expected misclassification cost.)
Fig. 1: Machine Learning Training
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We developed a classifier that converts the four-class
classification problem into two binary classification prob-
lems: one that classifies each account either as anonymous
or non-anonymous; the other that classifies each account
as either identifiable or non-identifiable. The results of the
two classifiers are then combined to classify each account
as “anonymous,” “identifiable” or “unknown” as described
below.
The training phase is shown in Figure 1. The training
data containing four classes gets relabeled into two data
sets containing the same number of training instances
as the original. In the first data set, all the instances
for classes other than the anonymous class get re-labeled
as ‘Non-Anonymous,’ and this data set is passed to a
binary classifier that is optimized for detecting anonymous
accounts. In the second data set, all the instances for
classes other than the identifiable get re-labeled as ‘Non-
Identifiable,’ and this data set is passed to a binary classi-
fier optimized for detecting identifiable accounts. Both the
binary classifiers use Random Forest with 100 trees as the
base classifier. The choice of the classifier and the number
of trees was based on the cross-validation performance
and out-of-bag error [24]. These classifiers are also cost-
sensitive meta classifiers, where higher costs are imposed
for mis-classifying instances as anonymous/identifiable.
Fig. 2: Anonymous and Identifiable: Precision vs. Recall
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The mis-classification costs are chosen independently for
the two binary classifiers. By varying the cost parameters
for the two binary classifiers, we can trade-off the precision
and recall values. For both the classes, the precision and
recall trade-off values based on 10-fold cross validation
are shown in Figure 2. For this study we chose the cost
parameters such that at least 90% precision is possible
for both anonymous and identifiable classes. Table IV
shows the choice of cost parameters, and the resulting
precision and recall values. Although the precision for both
anonymous and identifiable accounts is high, and the recall
for identifiable accounts is high, the recall for anonymous
accounts is 24.4%. Unlike spam or abuse detection tech-
niques, our sensitive account detector does not necessitate
identifying all of the anonymous or identifiable accounts –
What is most important is identifying a significant fraction
with low error rates. Hence, high recall values are not
absolutely necessary, and our results in the subsequent
sections validate this.
TABLE IV: Cost Parameters and Classifier Performance
Based on 10-fold Cross Validation
Label Cost Parameter Precision Recall
Anonymous 9.5 0.90 0.244
Identifiable 6.0 0.932 0.747
The testing phase is shown in Figure 3. Each test
instance gets passed to each of the binary classifiers,
which independently assigns a label to the instance. We
determine the final label based on the decision table in
Table V. “Unknown” means we do not attempt to classify
the account. After classifying approximately 404 million
followers in the test data, we did not come across any case
where an account was classified as both anonymous and
identifiable by the binary classifiers (corresponding to the
fourth row in Table V).
Fig. 3: Machine Learning Testing
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VI. Sensitive Account Discovery
The previous subsection showed how we can classify
many Twitter accounts with high precision as anonymous
or identifiable. We refer to these accounts as “discovered
TABLE V: Deciding Final Label for a Test Instance
Label1 Label2 Final Label
Anonymous Non-Identifiable Anonymous
Non-Anonymous Identifiable Identifiable
Non-Anonymous Non-Identifiable Unknown
Anonymous Identifiable Unknown(Did not occur)
anonymous” and “discovered identifiable” accounts. We
use these to find sensitive accounts.
As mentioned earlier in Section I, in our approach
we suspect that an arbitrary account is sensitive (non-
sensitive) if it has a relatively large (small) number of
anonymous followers and a relatively small (large) number
of identifiable users. To this end, we used the percentages
of “discovered anonymous” and “discovered identifiable”
accounts as proxies for the actual percentages of anony-
mous and identifiable accounts, since we can readily obtain
the percentages of the discovered accounts automatically
using machine learning, as shown in Section V-C.
To precisely state what we mean by large and small
percentages of discovered anonymous and identifiable ac-
counts, we returned to the 67 manually chosen sensitive
and non-sensitive accounts from the recent work [11]. Us-
ing the automated methodology developed in Section V-C,
we classified the followers of all these 67 accounts into
Anonymous, Identifiable and Unknown, and determined
the fractions of discovered anonymous and identifiable fol-
lowers for each account. Figure 4 shows a scatter diagram,
where each circle (triangle) corresponds to one of the cho-
sen sensitive (non-sensitive) accounts. For each account,
Figure 4 shows the fractions of discovered anonymous and
identifiable followers. Strikingly, the sensitive accounts all
lie at the top-left, and the non-sensitive accounts all lie
at the bottom-right of the plot. Using a Support Vector
Machine (SVM) classifier, we can separate the sensitive
and non-sensitive accounts in the scatter diagram. The
SVM classifier uses a linear kernel, with the regularization
parameter C as 5,000 (resulting in a narrow-margin linear
hyperplane). The linear hyperplane equation obtained is
y = 0.0575x + 0.0078.
It is to be noted that sensitivity is not a binary concept,
but rather a nuanced measure that should we viewed on
a continuum [13], [12]. We say that we suspect a Twitter
account to be sensitive if y > 0.0575x+ 0.0078, where y is
the fraction of discovered anonymous followers the account
has and x is the fraction of discovered identifiable followers
the account has. Further, if y >> 0.0575x + 0.0078, we
suspect the account to be very sensitive. In a similar
manner, we suspect accounts to be non-sensitive and very
non-sensitive by reversing the inequalities. While there
might not be perceptible difference between the accounts
close to the linear hyperplane, the extremes should exhibit
clearly distinct behavior. For a given account, the x and
y values are determined by the automatic classification
technique described in Section V-C. Note that although
the fraction of identifiable followers plays a role in our
sensitive account detection methodology, it is actually the
fraction of anonymous followers that carries the largest
weight.
Fig. 4: Scatter Plot of Sensitive and Non-Sensitive Ac-
counts Based on Discovered Anonymous and Identifiable
Followers
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When we applied this methodology to the 93,042 ran-
dom test accounts, 59.3% of the accounts lie on the
sensitive side of the linear hyperplane, and 40.7% lie on
the non-sensitive side. Admittedly, this approach also has
some subjectivity in the definition, as the coefficients in
the separating line depend on the 67 hand-chosen sensitive
and non-sensitive accounts. If we were to choose a different
set of accounts, the line y = 0.0575x + 0.0078 would
change some. However, we note that this approach does
not directly depend on pre-selected sensitive keywords
and, as we will show, identifies many sensitive categories
that were not covered by our hand-chosen 67 accounts
(and is hence generalizable). Also, this approach has an
additional advantage that it is not dependent on language
features and can be easily extended to content across a
wide variety of languages. To minimize the impact of small
changes in the coefficients of the line, we henceforth only
consider the accounts that are far away from the linear
hyperplane (i.e., the very sensitive and very non-sensitive
accounts).
VII. Validation
To validate that our methodology can indeed find sen-
sitive accounts on Twitter, we take three approaches.
First, we use Latent Dirichlet Allocation (LDA) to show
that the topics being discussed in the very sensitive
accounts identified by our methodology are indeed im-
mensely different from those being discussed in the very
non-sensitive accounts. Second, we manually look into the
individual accounts classified as very sensitive and see if
they are indeed about topics that many would consider
sensitive/controversial. Third, we ask four humans to sub-
jectively classify 200 accounts as either sensitive or non-
sensitive, and then check whether their classifications are
consistent with our automated classifications.
A. LDA Topic Analysis
Using LDA, we analyzed the tweets to determine if the
sensitive and non-sensitive accounts are indeed talking
about different topics. In LDA, each document is a collec-
tion of words; each topic is considered to be a probabilistic
distribution over a collection of words; and each document
is considered to be a probabilistic distribution over the
topics. The goal of LDA is to study the observable word
occurrences in the documents and to determine the latent
topics in the document collection, as well as the topics
discussed by each document [25].
We picked the 1,000 sensitive and 1,000 non-sensitive
accounts that are farthest from the linear SVM hyper-
plane, and obtained their most recent 200 tweets. The
median number of tweets for these 2,000 accounts is 196.
In our context, there is one document for each of the 2,000
accounts, and a document is all of the 200 tweets published
by the account. We performed the LDA topic analysis on
these 2,000 documents using the Stanford Topic Modeling
Toolkit 5. Specifically, we used the CVB0LDA model,
which is the Collapsed Variational Bayes approximation
to the LDA.
When performing LDA, we need to choose certain pa-
rameters – the number of topics and the Dirichlet prior
probabilities for the topic-word and document-topic dis-
tributions. To choose the number of topics, we performed
a Perplexity analysis [25]. For this, the document corpus is
split into two subsets (80-20 ratio): one used for training
the LDA model, and the other used for evaluating the
generated model on unseen data and generating a score
called perplexity. For each choice of the number of topics,
we calculated the perplexities. A lower value for the
perplexity indicates a better model [25]. Based on this
analysis we chose 250 topics for our study. After testing
some commonly used configurations for prior probabilities
for topic-word and document-topic distributions, based on
performance we chose Symmetric Dirichlet priors with 0.01
probability for both. In summary, we performed the LDA
analysis on the 2,000 documents using the CVB0LDA
model with 250 topics and Symmetric Dirichlet priors with
0.01 probability as the parameters.
LDA gives us the topic weight distribution for each
document/account. So for each identified topic, we then
calculate the cumulative weight for that topic across all
the sensitive accounts, and also do the same for the non-
sensitive accounts. (Note that the total cumulative weight
to be distributed across all the topics is the same for the
sensitive and non-sensitive accounts, as there are 1000
accounts of each.) Therefore, each of the 250 topics has two
cumulative weights, one for the accounts in the sensitive
category and one for the non-sensitive category; moreover,
5http://nlp.stanford.edu/software/tmt/tmt-0.4
Fig. 5: Topic Usage Across Sensitive and Non-Sensitive Accounts Ordered by the Decreasing Ratio of Cumulative
Weight of Sensitive Over Non-sensitive (Numbers on x-axis do not Correspond to Topic Numbers)
if a topic has higher cumulative weight for the sensitive
category, then we can say it has a stronger affinity with the
sensitive accounts. The distribution of cumulative weights
for topics across sensitive and non-sensitive categories
is shown in Figure 5, where each point on the x-axis
indicates one of the 250 topics. The topics are ordered
by decreasing ratio of the cumulative weight of sensitive
over non-sensitive categories. (The numbering on the x-
axis does not correspond to the topic numbers.) Figure 5
clearly shows that certain topics are very popular among
the sensitive accounts, but have little or no interest to all
the non-sensitive accounts.
Some of the topics with the highest cumulative weights
from the sensitive and non-sensitive accounts, and the top
terms occurring in each topic, are shown in Table VI (ratio
rank is the position of the topic when ordered according to
the decreasing ratio of cumulative weights of sensitive over
non-sensitive accounts). These topics are also highlighted
in Figure 5. We purposefully selectively list some of the
top topics, rather than list the top-k topics, as per the
cumulative weight ratio, because we want to describe the
peaks in Figure 5 and also highlight the theme diversity,
as there were numerous topics belonging to the same
general theme. For example, among the top 15 topics
dominant among the sensitive accounts, 12 belonged to
pornography, 2 belonged to cybersex, and 1 belonged to
drugs/marijuana themes.
We clearly see the distinction between the topic themes
in the sensitive and non-sensitive categories, giving cre-
dence to our claim that the sensitive accounts are indeed
talking about different topics than the non-sensitive ac-
counts. In Figure 5, most of the peaks in the sensitive
category belong to sex-related topics. For example, topic
#174 relates to adult swingers (containing words related
to sharing nude pictures or inviting sexual partners). But
we also see many other non-sex-related topics, such as
pregnancy, or sharing personal feelings or experiences.
Though not listed in Table VI, we noticed the presence of
other topics – such as weight loss (related to both regular
and extreme cases of anorexia), fitness, marriage problems,
and relationships – receiving high cumulative weight across
the sensitive accounts. Comparatively, all the topic themes
dominating the non-sensitive accounts relate to “mundane
topics” such as coupons, weather, sports, education, and
so on.
1) Topic Overlap: Figure 5 shows the ratio of cumula-
tive weights for sensitive and non-sensitive accounts across
250 topics. There are just 34 topics (out of 250) for which
the ratio is in the range of [0.5,2]. But perhaps most
collections of two sets of 1,000 accounts would have similar
topic properties?
To explore this issue more deeply, we conducted LDA
topic analysis on additional sets of accounts. The first
set contained two sensitive groups, each containing 1,000
accounts picked randomly from the farthest 10,000 very
sensitive accounts from the SVM hyperplane. The second
set contained two non-sensitive groups, each with 1,000
accounts picked randomly from the farthest 10,000 very
non-sensitive accounts. We performed LDA topic analysis
on each of the two sets independently (using the same LDA
parameters as before), and determined the topic usage
across the different accounts. For each set, we determined
the cumulative weight for each identified topic across
the two groups of accounts. The cumulative weight ratio
distributions for the identified topics in each set are shown
in Figure 6. The results for the first set are represented
as Sensitive vs. Sensitive, and those for the second set
are represented as Non-Sensitive vs. Non-Sensitive. For
comparison, we also include the ratio graph in Figure 5
as Sensitive vs. Non-Sensitive. Notice that the Sensitive
vs. Sensitive ratio curve and the Non-Sensitive vs. Non-
Sensitive ratio curves are very flat. This indicates that the
two groups of sensitive accounts are largely talking about
similar things; similarly, the two groups of non-sensitive
TABLE VI: The Diversity of Top Topics in Sensitive and Non-Sensitive Categories (Pornographic words are in asterisks)
Topic ID
Ratio Cumulative Weight
Top Terms ThemeRank Sensitive Non-
Sensitive
226 6 67.26 0.39 p***y, c**k, f**k, c*m, a**,
hard, h***y, s**y, wet, hot,
wants, f**king, l**k, s**k, nice
Pornography
084 8 14.94 0.12 kik, h***y, s*x, p***y, pics,
skype, couples, retweet, guys,
m**f, wants, add, chat, a**e,
kikme
Cybersex
139 11 20.03 0.34 weed, smoke, high, smoking,
f**k, blunt, bong, shit, stoned,
stoner, hit, stonernation, bowl,
stoners, joint
Drugs -
Marijuana
209 34 7.05 2.98 skinny, thinspo, anorexia, fat,
eat, depression, ana, eating,
hungry, look, stomach, dont,
true, feel, fucking
Anorexia
244 35 10.63 4.53 feel, line, friends, care, friend,
cross, things, person, miss,
beautiful, matter, say, cause,
thing, afraid
Feelings
044 38 7.68 5.19 baby, pregnant, really, congrats,
married, girl, congratulations,
beautiful, little, mom, gonna,
daughter, getting, guys, amaz-
ing
Pregnancy
072 250 0.04 31.18 tomorrow, team, awesome, big,
excited, congrats, family, check,
game, ready, fun, year, looking,
let, proud
Generic
153 247 0.08 9.28 school, students, iaedchat,
teachers, learning, join, year,
edchat, classroom, team,
edtech, teacher, satchat, kids,
educators
Education
235 244 0.05 5.22 coupon, matches, coupons,
store, tesco, team, cvs, deals,
walgreens, dixie, free, stores,
meridian, deal, aid
Deals /
Coupons
111 207 0.23 7.37 warning, severe, county, storms,
thunderstorm, rain, radar, af-
ternoon, temps, evening, mph,
tornado, winds, moving, issued
Weather
104 193 0.41 9.69 mate, game, arsenal, man, pal,
lads, goal, cup, cheers, big,
league, season, city, liverpool,
world
Sports
accounts are largely talking about similar things. Inter-
estingly, the ratio distributions for Sensitive vs. Sensitive
and Non-Sensitive vs. Non-Sensitive are nearly identical.
However, the curve comparing sensitive accounts with non-
sensitive accounts exhibits a distinctly stronger decreasing
trend over a much wider range of ratios, confirming that
the sensitive accounts and non-sensitive accounts are in-
deed talking about different topics.
B. Types of Very Sensitive Accounts
To further evaluate whether our methodology is indeed
identifying sensitive accounts, we manually inspected the
top 300 very sensitive accounts as determined by our
methodology, and assigned each account to a category.
Table VII lists the number of accounts that fall into each
category. The miscellaneous accounts belong to profiles of
individuals (almost all self-identify as females), or ones
that share multimedia, have non-English tweets, and are
protected or de-activated (after our initial data gathering,
some accounts were de-activated).
As expected, pornography, drugs, and adult content are
pervasive in the sensitive accounts. There were also numer-
ous swinger accounts involving married couples sharing
Fig. 6: Comparing Ratios of Cumulative Topic Weights
Across Different Account Groups
intimate pictures of themselves and inviting swingers.
Most of the pictures uploaded by accounts belonging to
these sex-related categories contain nudity, but they are
not tagged as such, violating Twitter’s media policies [9].
We identified several accounts discussing drugs, such
as marijuana. These users often share their experiences
or invite others for an in-person meeting. Some of these
accounts actually claim to sell or deliver marijuana. With
marijuana being illegal in many countries and states, local
authorities could be potentially interested in using our
methodology for tracking these accounts and flagging them
for take down.
Though Table VII lists just one account supporting and
fighting for rights of lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender
groups, we observed many accounts belonging to this
group among the top 1000 sensitive accounts. For many
people, disclosing one’s sexual orientation is a sensitive
issue and hence users may prefer not to identify them-
selves when following these accounts. Interestingly, we
observed many anonymous followers for Twitter accounts
self-identifying as high school and college females. Ac-
counts self-identifying as female fitness and yoga accounts,
in which users discuss their diet and upload pictures of
their progress, also had many anonymous followers.
In addition to these themes, we discovered several ac-
counts that deal with severe cases of anorexia, social
anxiety, depression and suicidal tendencies. The existence
of accounts related to stigmatized topic themes in the very
sensitive category testifies to the importance of privacy
and anonymity in our society. People would be much less
inclined to use these self-help accounts without anonymity.
In fact, we noticed some of these accounts uploading pic-
tures after having physically abused their bodies. Health
institutions are already employing Twitter for real-time
monitoring of individuals with suicidal tendencies [26].
They could potentially use our methodology to identify
people in urgent need of support.
TABLE VII: Top Sensitive Accounts and their Themes
# of
ThemeSensitive
Accounts
106 Couples sharing their sexual escapades
or looking for swingers. Pictures are not
tagged for nudity.
47 Arabic Adult/Gay Content. Pictures are
not tagged for nudity.
21 Relate to pornography/adult content. Pic-
tures are not tagged for nudity.
12 Related to drugs, such as marijuana. Some
accounts offer drug delivery services.
9 Accounts self-identifying as high school
and college girls (some in their teens).
8 People obsessed with weight loss or
anorexia.
6 Expressing depression, suicidal tendencies,
or social anxieties.
5 Relate to Gay/Lesbian pornography. Most
of the pictures are not tagged for nudity.
5 Self-identifying as Female fitness or yoga
accounts. Upload pictures of their diet or
progress.
1 Groups supporting Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual,
Transgender and Queer (LGBTQ).
80 Miscellaneous
C. Survey Evaluation
As a final validation procedure, we asked 4 independent
evaluators to examine the top 100 sensitive and the top
100 non-sensitive accounts (i.e. those farthest from the
SVM hyperplane). The 200 accounts were presented to
the evaluators in a random order. Each evaluator visited
the 200 Twitter account pages and labeled each account
as sensitive or non-sensitive based on their subjective
judgement. The majority label was considered as the final
label assignment for the account.
Our automatic sensitive account classifier was largely
consistent with the human labeling. For the 100 non-
sensitive accounts, only 3 accounts were labeled by the
human evaluators as sensitive. For the 100 sensitive ac-
counts, 70 were labeled by the human evaluators as sen-
sitive. For the remaining 30 accounts, 3 were protected
accounts (activated the protected status after our initial
data gathering), 13 self-identify as high school and college
females, 7 self-identify as females posting about fitness, 2
self-identify as guys (a college student and an actor), and
the remaining 5 were about sharing multimedia (pictures,
Twitter Vine videos), love quotes, or not in English. From
this survey we see that the vast majority of accounts with a
small fraction of anonymous followers and a large fraction
of identifiable followers are indeed non-sensitive from the
perspective of the subjective humans. Also, the majority of
the accounts with a large fraction of anonymous followers
and a small fraction of identifiable followers are sensitive
from the perspective of the subjective humans. However,
there are accounts – such as those maintained by high-
school, college, and fitness-concerned females – that many
people would not consider to be sensitive but nevertheless
have a large fraction of anonymous followers. This in itself
is an interesting insight, and merits further investigation
in the future.
In summary, we have evaluated our methodology for
discovering sensitive accounts from three different an-
gles: LDA topic analysis using 2,000 sensitive and non-
sensitive accounts; manually inspecting and categorizing
the 300 most sensitive accounts; and finally, asking sub-
jective humans to label 200 accounts as sensitive or non-
sensitive. These evaluations clearly show that the vast
majority of automatically-identified sensitive accounts are
tweeting about topics that are very different from the
automatically-identified non-sensitive accounts, that the
majority of the sensitive accounts deal with topics that
most people consider to be sensitive (including those that
violate local laws), and that the methodology finds many
sensitive topics – such as obesity and anorexia - which were
not originally hand-chosen in the prior study [11]. Finally
the approach can easily scale across all of the Twitter
accounts. All the experimentation was done on a single
quad-core machine with 8GB RAM, and the sensitive
account detection took just 1-2 hours to label the 93,000
accounts with 404 million followers.
VIII. Related Work
A. Online Anonymity
There is a huge body of research work based on surveys
and user interviews that evaluates if online anonymity is
harmful [27], [28] or beneficial [29], [30], [31]. A few have
evaluated if users are actively seeking anonymity on the
web [32], and if anonymity features in the products are
actively used [33], [11], [34]. In this paper, we do not
focus on the debate of whether online anonymity is useful
or harmful, or quantify if users exercise anonymity. We
instead leverage user anonymity patterns to automatically
detect sensitive accounts in social networks.
B. Identifying Sensitive Content
There has not been much work on exploring the diver-
sity of topics that online users consider sensitive. Some at-
tempts to understand user content sensitivity preferences
have been restricted to capturing user views on a pre-
determined list of topic categories [35], [36], [12], or rely
on user self-reporting during surveys and interviews [14].
These methodologies have limitations of being subjective,
or are expensive to capture across a sufficiently large user
sample.
Data-driven studies alleviate some of these limitations.
[12] analyzed 500 Whisper social media posts to un-
derstand the range of topics users consider sensitive.
A recently conducted data-driven study examines user
content sensitivity preferences in the context of Quora,
a question and answer service [13]. Though similarities
exist to some of the inferences we draw in this paper
and the Quora study, there are significant differences
between the two. The Quora study deals with identifying
sensitive topic categories, while we focus on identifying
sensitive accounts. The Quora study relies on predefined
content category tags, while our study does not and is
able to generalize to include overlooked topics. Quora
forces users to be completely identifiable [37], and allows
temporarily adopting complete anonymity (for example,
when answering a sensitive question). The case of Twitter
is more complex and noisy: (i) there are many different
levels of user anonymity (Section III-B), and (ii) because
the chosen anonymity is permanent, an anonymous user
can follow both sensitive and non-sensitive accounts using
the same profile.
C. Other Studies on Twitter
Researchers have analyzed the user social graph and
performed tweet content analysis to understand: how users
choose others to follow [38]; identifying spam [18], [19];
verifying information credibility on social networks [39];
determining information dissemination [20]; measuring
user influence [40]; identifying personally identifiable infor-
mation (PII) leakage [41] and developing machine learning
classifiers to detect it [42]; detecting offensive tweets [43];
and identifying individuals who are at risk for suicide [26].
Unlike these existing studies, we rely on account follower
anonymity preferences that, to the best of our knowledge,
has not been previously explored.
IX. Conclusion
We developed a novel methodology for identifying sen-
sitive accounts on Twitter. Rather than using tweet word
occurrences, our methodology is based on follower anony-
mity patterns. This approach not only easily scales across
all Twitter accounts, but also is not limited to finding
only accounts with pre-chosen words, and is not limited by
the language features. To show that our methodology can
process data at the Twitter scale, we applied it on a large
Twitter crawl containing approximately 100,000 accounts
with 404 million active followers.
We evaluated our methodology three different ways.
First we used LDA topic analysis using 2,000 sensitive and
non-sensitive accounts. The analysis clearly showed that
the identified sensitive accounts are tweeting about topics
that are very different from the identified non-sensitive
accounts. We then manually inspected and categorized the
300 most sensitive accounts, and observed that the major-
ity of these accounts indeed tweet about topics that can
be considered sensitive, including pornography, LGBTQ
issues and depression. Finally, we asked subjective humans
to label 200 accounts as sensitive or non-sensitive. The
human labeling was largely consistent with our automated
labeling.
Although our approach provides a scalable and objec-
tive way to understand content sensitivity, we believe
more in-depth research is needed to improve user privacy
preferences and expectations in the social media context.
For instance, it is worth exploring and quantifying how
many sensitive content categories are consistent across
different social applications and how many are dependent
on the nature of the application (e.g., photo sharing vs.
messaging). Also, it needs to be seen if combining text
based methods with user anonymity based methods can
provide better identification rates. Our findings in this
paper can help influence defining new privacy policies and
controls.
References
[1] S. T. Peddinti, K. Ross, and J. Cappos, “Finding sensitive
accounts on twitter: An automated approach based on follower
anonymity,” 2016. [Online]. Available: http://www.aaai.org/
ocs/index.php/ICWSM/ICWSM16/paper/view/13063
[2] H. Nissenbaum, Privacy in context: Technology, policy, and the
integrity of social life. Stanford University Press, 2009.
[3] CNIL, “CNIL,” https://www.cnil.fr/en/home, 2016.
[4] Microsoft, “Microsoft Advertising Creative Acceptance Policy
Guide,” http://advertising.microsoft.com/en-uk/WWDocs/
User/display/cl/content standard/2007/global/Microsoft-
Advertising-Creative-Acceptance-Policy-Guide.pdf, 2013.
[5] Facebook, “Facebook Advertising Guidelines,” https://www.
facebook.com/ad guidelines.php, 2014.
[6] Google, “Google Policies and Principles,” http://www.google.
com/policies/privacy/key-terms/#toc-terms-info, 2014.
[7] naiin, “Child pornography via Tweet: pedophiles abuse Twitter
as a distribution channel,” http://www.naiin.org/en/news/
Child-pornography-via-Tweet-pedophiles-abuse-Twitter-as-a-
distribution-channel-75.html, 2015.
[8] J. Elder, “Facebook Cracks Down on Illegal Guns
Posts: Web Site Bows to Pressure From Anti-
Violence Groups,” http://online.wsj.com/articles/
SB10001424052702304732804579421680522756074.
[9] Twitter, “Twitter Media Policy,” https://support.twitter.com/
articles/20169199-twitter-media-policy, 2014.
[10] ——, “Twitter: How to report violations,” https://support.
twitter.com/articles/15789-how-to-report-violations, 2014.
[11] S. T. Peddinti, K. W. Ross, and J. Cappos, ““On the Internet,
nobody knows you’re a dog”: A Twitter Case Study of Anony-
mity in Social Networks,” in Proceedings of the ACM Conference
on Online Social Networks (COSN), 2014.
[12] D. Correa, L. A. Silva, M. Mondal, F. Benevenuto, and K. P.
Gummadi, “The Many Shades of Anonymity: Characterizing
Anonymous Social Media Content,” in Ninth International
AAAI Conference on Web and Social Media, 2015.
[13] S. T. Peddinti, A. Korolova, E. Bursztein, and G. Sampemane,
“Cloak and swagger: Understanding data sensitivity through
the lens of user anonymity,” in Proceedings of the 35th IEEE
Symposium on Security & Privacy, 2014.
[14] Y. Wang, G. Norcie, S. Komanduri, A. Acquisti, P. G. Leon,
and L. F. Cranor, “‘I regretted the minute I pressed share’: a
qualitative study of regrets on Facebook,” in Proceedings of the
Seventh Symposium on Usable Privacy and Security (SOUPS),
2011.
[15] H.-F. Yu, C.-J. Hsieh, H. Yun, S. Vishwanathan, and I. S.
Dhillon, “A scalable asynchronous distributed algorithm for
topic modeling,” in Proceedings of the 24th International
Conference on World Wide Web, ser. WWW ’15. New York,
NY, USA: ACM, 2015, pp. 1340–1350. [Online]. Available:
http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/2736277.2741682
[16] B. Bi, Y. Tian, Y. Sismanis, A. Balmin, and J. Cho,
“Scalable topic-specific influence analysis on microblogs,” in
Proceedings of the 7th ACM International Conference on
Web Search and Data Mining, ser. WSDM ’14. New York,
NY, USA: ACM, 2014, pp. 513–522. [Online]. Available:
http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/2556195.2556229
[17] d. m. boyd, “Friendster and publicly articulated social network-
ing,” in Extended Abstracts on Human Factors in Computing
Systems (CHI EA), 2004.
[18] C. Grier, K. Thomas, V. Paxson, and M. Zhang, “@spam:
The underground on 140 characters or less,” in Proceedings of
the 17th ACM Conference on Computer and Communications
Security (CCS), 2010.
[19] K. Thomas, C. Grier, D. Song, and V. Paxson, “Suspended
accounts in retrospect: An analysis of twitter spam,” in Pro-
ceedings of the 2011 ACM SIGCOMM Conference on Internet
Measurement Conference (IMC), 2011.
[20] H. Kwak, C. Lee, H. Park, and S. Moon, “What is twitter, a
social network or a news media?” in Proceedings of the 19th
International Conference on World Wide Web (WWW), 2010.
[21] Census Bureau, “United States Census Bureau: Genealogy
Data,” http://www.census.gov/genealogy/www/data/index.
html, 2014.
[22] Social Security Administration, “Social Security: Beyond
the Top 1000 Names,” http://www.ssa.gov/oact/babynames/
limits.html, 2014.
[23] M. Hall, E. Frank, G. Holmes, B. Pfahringer, P. Reutemann,
and I. H. Witten, “The weka data mining software: An update,”
SIGKDD Explor. Newsl., vol. 11, no. 1, 2009.
[24] G. James, D. Witten, T. Hastie, and R. Tibshirani, An Introduc-
tion to Statistical Learning: with Applications in R, ser. Springer
Texts in Statistics. Springer New York, 2014.
[25] D. M. Blei, A. Y. Ng, and M. I. Jordan, “Latent dirichlet
allocation,” the Journal of machine Learning research, vol. 3,
2003.
[26] J. Jashinsky, S. H. Burton, C. L. Hanson, J. West, C. Giraud-
Carrier, M. D. Barnes, and T. Argyle, “Tracking suicide risk
factors through twitter in the us.” Crisis: The Journal of Crisis
Intervention and Suicide Prevention, vol. 35, 2014.
[27] Y. Lelkes, J. A. Krosnick, D. M. Marx, C. M. Judd, and
B. Park, “Complete anonymity compromises the accuracy
of self-reports,” Journal of Experimental Social Psychology,
vol. 48, no. 6, 2012.
[28] D. R. Millen and J. F. Patterson, “Identity disclosure and the
creation of social capital,” in CHI ’03 Extended Abstracts on
Human Factors in Computing Systems, ser. CHI EA ’03, 2003.
[29] A. Joinson, “Social desirability, anonymity, and internet-based
questionnaires,” Behavior Research Methods, Instruments, &
Computers, vol. 31, no. 3, 1999.
[30] T. Postmes, R. Spears, K. Sakhel, and D. de Groot, “Social
influence in computer-mediated communication: The effects of
anonymity on group behavior,” Personality and Social Psychol-
ogy Bulletin, vol. 27, no. 10, 2001.
[31] T. Connolly, L. M. Jessup, and J. S. Valacich, “Effects of Anony-
mity and Evaluative Tone on Idea Generation in Computer-
Mediated Groups,” Management Science, vol. 36, no. 6, 1990.
[32] R. Kang, S. Brown, and S. Kiesler, “Why do people seek
anonymity on the internet?: informing policy and design,” in
Proceedings of the SIGCHI Conference on Human Factors in
Computing Systems (CHI), 2013.
[33] M. S. Bernstein, A. Monroy-Herna´ndez, D. Harry, P. Andre´,
K. Panovich, and G. G. Vargas, “4chan and/b: An analysis
of anonymity and ephemerality in a large online community.”
in Proceedings of the 5th International AAAI Conference on
Weblogs and Social Media (ICWSM), 2011.
[34] V. Go´mez, A. Kaltenbrunner, and V. Lo´pez, “Statistical anal-
ysis of the social network and discussion threads in slashdot,”
in Proceedings of the 17th International Conference on World
Wide Web (WWW), 2008.
[35] L. Rainie, S. Kiesler, R. Kang, and M. Madden, “Anonymity,
Privacy, And Security Online: Part 4: How Users Feel
About the Sensitivity of Certain Kinds of Data,”
http://www.pewinternet.org/2013/09/05/part-4-how-users-
feel-about-the-sensitivity-of-certain-kinds-of-data/, 2013.
[36] K. Hawkey and K. M. Inkpen, “Examining the content and
privacy of web browsing incidental information,” in Proceed-
ings of the 15th International Conference on World Wide Web
(WWW), 2006.
[37] Quora, “Do I have to use my real name on Quora? What is
Quora’s Real Names policy?” http://www.quora.com/Do-I-
have-to-use-my-real-name-on-Quora-What-is-Quoras-Real-
Names-policy, 2015.
[38] A. Java, X. Song, T. Finin, and B. Tseng, “Why we twitter:
Understanding microblogging usage and communities,” in Pro-
ceedings of the 9th WebKDD and 1st SNA-KDD Workshop on
Web Mining and Social Network Analysis, 2007.
[39] C. Castillo, M. Mendoza, and B. Poblete, “Information cred-
ibility on twitter,” in Proceedings of the 20th International
Conference on World Wide Web (WWW), 2011.
[40] M. Cha, H. Haddadi, F. Benevenuto, and K. Gummadi, “Mea-
suring user influence in twitter: The million follower fallacy,” in
Proceedings of 4th International AAAI Conference on Weblogs
and Social Media (ICWSM), 2010.
[41] L. Humphreys, P. Gill, and B. Krishnamurthy, “How much is too
much? privacy issues on twitter,” in Conference of International
Communication Association, Singapore, 2010.
[42] H. Mao, X. Shuai, and A. Kapadia, “Loose tweets: An analysis
of privacy leaks on twitter,” in Proceedings of the 10th Annual
ACM Workshop on Privacy in the Electronic Society (WPES),
2011.
[43] G. Xiang, B. Fan, L. Wang, J. Hong, and C. Rose, “Detect-
ing offensive tweets via topical feature discovery over a large
scale twitter corpus,” in Proceedings of the 21st ACM interna-
tional conference on Information and knowledge management
(CIKM), 2012.
